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HOME RULE, MAJORITY RULE, AND DILLON'S RULE
RICHARD BRIFFAULT*

Clayton Gillette's In PartialPraise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?1 is an ambitious attempt
to breathe new life into an old local government law chestnut through
the analytical tools of modern political economy. Gillette asserts that
because the Rule permits state judges to invalidate local legislation that
results from "one-sided lobbying," Dillon's Rule increases the allocational efficiency of local decision making and reduces the deadweight
losses attendant on special interest pursuit of rent-seeking ordinances.
According to Gillette, Dillon's Rule checks the danger of special interest
abuse of local politics by constraining local government actions in areas
prone to special interest manipulation. He contends that local residents
would have consented to Dillon's Rule if it had been presented to them;
indeed, he suggests the existence of Dillon's Rule may contribute to the
willingness of people to submit themselves to local governments. Thus,
Gillette would have us believe that Dillion's Rule-which has so often
been condemned by local government scholars as antithetical to local
self-government-actually vindicates the interests of local majorities and
sustains local autonomy itself.
Gillette's is an ambitious thesis, appealing as much in its audacity
and its analytical style as in its substantive project of finding legal rules
that would promote public-regarding local self-government. Unfortunately, Gillette's effort fails. The base metal of arbitrary state judicial
intervention in local decision making that is Dillon's Rule cannot be alchemically transmuted into a public interest-serving Golden Rule. To
answer the question posed in his title, "public choice theory" cannot
"justify" local government law-or at least Gillette's theory does not
"justify" Dillon's Rule under his standard of promoting the local public
interest.
Gillette's public choice defense of Dillon's Rule consists of two arguments: (1) Local governments are particularly vulnerable to special interest manipulation; and (2) Dillon's Rule is well-designed to catch and
prevent such special interest abuses of the local political process. Both
arguments are crucial, but neither argument is persuasive. Ultimately,
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1991).
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Gillette's theory fails because his approach to local governments is too
abstract and misses the politics actually characteristic of most localities.
In the small residential communities which are the principal setting
for local government in contemporary America, politics is dominated not
by the "one-sided lobbying" of manipulative minorities but, instead, by
taxpayer and homeowner majorities. Gillette's paper fails to consider the
reality of majority rule in many localities or how to determine whether
majority decisions are special interest abuses or definitions of the local
public interest. Moreover, a Dillon's Rule which is used primarily to
invalidate decisions supported by local majorities is the same old antimajoritarian Rule that has long been the target of localist invective,
rather than Gillette's majority-supported anti-minority-manipulation
Rule.
Regardless of whether local measures are more likely to be the product of majoritarian rather than minority influence, there is nothing in the
terms of Dillon's Rule or in its judicial application that suggests that the
Rule is a useful mechanism for suppressing manipulation and increasing
deliberation. Special judicial scrutiny of local innovations under Dillon's
Rule is both over- and underinclusive with respect to special interest manipulation of local politics. There is no particular connection between
innovation and legislative manipulation; many rent-seeking municipal actions are in areas of traditional local competence and many local innovations are products of open and deliberative local processes. Moreover,
Gillette's Rule presumes that state courts will be particularly adept at
policing the quality of deliberation of city councils and town boards, and
that they will do so while scrupulously avoiding being influenced by their
own biases concerning the substances of the local measures. There is
nothing in the history of Dillon's Rule to support Gillette's optimism.
I.

SPECIAL INTERESTS, MAJORITY RULE, AND LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS

Crucial to Gillette's thesis is the assumption that local governments
must be especially subject to special interest capture. If local governments are no more subject to special interest capture than are state or
federal governments, and if Dillon's Rule does the work Gillette says it
does, then we would need a Dillon's Rule at all levels of government.
Although there is a strand of public choice theory that supports just such
heightened judicial scrutiny of economic legislation in order to save us
from rent-seeking behavior in Congress and the state legislatures, 2 Gil2. See, e.g., DANIEL A.

FARBER & PHILIP

P.

FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE

63-73
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lette does not make this argument nor does he call for a general return to
Lochner-style judicial review. Rather, his concern is with the particular
susceptibility of local governments to special interest manipulation.
According to Gillette,
local issues have characteristics that tend to exacerbate both formation
of privileged groups and free riding by latent groups. The possibility
that interest groups are particularly likely to form at the local level
stems from that body of collective action theory that suggests the possibility3 of collective action is directly related to size of the affected
group.
As Gillette notes, the costs of organization will be lower when the
number of people to be organized is small, and the ability to prevent
defections and free riding will be much greater where small size increases
the importance of reputation and the capacity for monitoring group
members. Thus, the small size of many localities will make it easier for
interest groups to function.
Gillette, however, does not purport to criticize the role of interest
groups per se. Indeed, the standard public choice account of the American political process is one of interest group conflict. We assume that
interest groups will form, and we rely on groups to safeguard their own
interests and to constrain each other. So long as the fights are fair, all
groups have access to the process, and "discrete and insular" minorities
are defended from the consequences of political isolation and repeated
defeat, we ordinarily treat the results of interest group battles as acceptable products of representative democracy. Interest group conflict may
not be a pretty picture but it is endemic to American government.
Gillette, however, asserts that at the local level the interest group
fights will not be fair and the outcome of interest groups battles will,
thus, be suspect. Local governments, he contends, are particularly susceptible to "one-sided" interest group lobbying. Some groups-the
"privileged" groups-will form; but other groups-"latent groups"will fail to coalesce. Without sufficient opposition from the "latent
groups," the "privileged groups" will dominate the local politics and subvert local government to their own ends.
Again, Gillette's thesis requires that such asymmetrical lobbying be
more likely at the local level than at the state or nation, lest we need a
Dillon's Rule for all levels of government. But nothing in Gillette's article supports his assumption that local governments are particularly
(1991) (presenting and criticizing this use of public choice theory to support heightened judicial
scrutiny of economic regulation generally).
3. Gillette, supra note 1,at 981.
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prone to one-sided lobbying. Indeed, Gillette's own argument concerning the significance of the relatively small size of local polities cuts the
other way.
The theory of collective action tells us that small groups will tend to
have an edge over large groups in attempting to organize and in maintaining their organizational existence. 4 As Gillette points out, at the local level the small groups-the special interests-are likely to be
especially small and therefore especially easy to organize. But at the local level, particularly in small towns and residential suburbs, even the
"large," arguably latent, groups will also often be relatively small. Certainly, in most local polities the difference in scale between small groups
and large groups is likely to be much less than at the state or national
level. At the state level, "developers" and "landlords"-to mention two
of Gillette's "privileged" groups-may number in the hundreds or
thousands, while in a locality they may number in the dozens or single
digits, so they are more likely to coalesce at the municipal level. But in
the same locality their latent opponents-"preservationists," "homeowners," "tenants"-may number only in the hundreds or single-digit
thousands-far less than the relatively unorganizable hundreds of
thousands or millions of preservationists, homeowners, or tenants at the
state level.
Half of all municipal corporations have populations of 1,000 or
fewer, and three-quarters of all municipalities have 5,000 people or fewer.
Nearly half of all urban Americans live in municipalities of fewer than
50,000 people. 5 If small size is the key to organization-and Gillette suggests it is the basis for the advantage of the "privileged" over the "latent"-then the small size of most localities should enable most groups of
local interests to form in those communities. Even larger localities are
smaller than the states and the nation of which they are a part. In general, the smaller size of localities, relative to state and nation, should
make it easier not more difficult for otherwise "latent" groups to coalesce
at the local level.
In any event, the scale of the disparity between privileged special
interests and other latent groups should be considerably narrower at the
local level. In small towns and residential suburbs, where the membership of privileged groups may number in the tens and the residents who
fall into the latent groups may be counted in the thousands, the gap in
4.

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION

53-57 (1971).

5. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS
8-9 (table 6) (Aug. 1983).
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potential for organization may be 1:100; but in the states, even if the
special interests number in the hundreds and thousands, the members of
the latent groups will number in the hundred thousands and millions, for
a disparity of 1:1000 or 1:10,000. Surely, the asymmetry of special interest formation should dictate a Dillon's Rule for the nation and the states
before it is imposed on local governments.
A second, and more serious, objection follows from Gillette's failure
to consider fully the significance of the small size of local governments.
Although his critique of special interest domination suggests that special
interests will be privileged minorities, at the local level "privileged" special interests will often be local majorities. Indeed, the theoretical and
empirical literature on local government suggests that the important decisions of the typical municipality will often reflect the interests and policies of local majorities.
In the American political tradition, the most famous statement concerning the potential for majoritarian control of local political institutions is Madison's. As he put it in the Tenth Federalist,
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests,
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the
6 more easily will
they concert and execute their plans of oppression.
Madison's original insight concerning the majoritarian propensities
of smaller units is supported by Tiebout's critique and borne out by recent studies of suburban politics. According to the Tiebout model, the
large number of local governments and the relative ease of movement
among them mean that people will be drawn to localities providing the
types and levels of services they desire. People will sort themselves out
by settling in the jurisdictions whose mix of taxes, services, and regulations they prefer and by leaving the localities whose tax-service-regulation packages they dislike. As a result, local governments will draw the
people whose preferences most resemble those of the currently dominant
political groups, while they lose local dissenters and fail to attract people
who do not agree with local public decisions. Localities will tend to become more homogeneous so that more and more people will belong to
7
local majorities.
In contemporary American metropolitan areas, suburban communi6. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT L. BISH, THE PUBLIC ECONOMY OF METROPOLITAN AREAS 51-52

(1971).
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ties are, in fact, increasingly homogeneous. Most suburbs are specialized
according to economic function-they are either residential or industrial
but rarely both 8-and the ethnicity and income of their residents. 9 The
increasing number of municipal governments in metropolitan areas has
actually led to greater demographic homogeneity within particular local
units much as it has enhanced interlocal ethnic and wealth differences.' 0
Small size, Tieboutian sorting and ethnic and economic stratification
mean that the populations of many localities are relatively homogeneous
in social and economic terms and in the political interests they would like
their local governments to advance.
In these communities it should be particularly easy for majorities to
form and to see their fiscal, service and regulatory preferences enacted
into local law. Indeed, suburban politics is frequently characterized as
dominated by local homeowner or taxpayer majorities, and local land use
policies such as exclusionary zoning and growth controls are plainly the
products of local majority rule.'I
At times Gillette seems to recognize the likelihood of majoritarian
control of local politics. After all, who are his "privileged" groups and
who are the "latent" ones? Gillette never actually provides a standard
for distinguishing the privileged from the latent other than at the purely
tautological level that the privileged groups do form and the latent ones
do not. But his examples of privileged groups hint at the possibility that
privileged groups will in fact represent local majorities. Some of his ex13
2
amples of the "privileged" are real estate developers' and landlords
who threaten to use their influence and campaign contributions to
swamp the latent interests of "preservationists" and "tenants." But his
"privileged groups" also include large, diffuse and not especially privi8. See, e.g., John R. Logan, Industrializationand the Stratification of Cities in Suburban Re-

gions, 82 AM. J. Soc. 333, 334, 341 (1976).
9. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV
346, 436 (1990).
10. See, e.g., GREGORY R. WEIHER, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND METROPOLITAN SEGREGATION (1991); Richard Child Hill, Separate and Unequal:

Governmental Inequality in the Metropolis, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1557 (1974). Although the

number of poor and working class people and racial minorities in the suburbs continues to increase,
the increased heterogeneity of suburbia as a whole is usually not matched by a greater ethnic diversity within particular suburbs. Douglass S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Suburbanization and Segregation in US. Metropolitan Areas, 94 AM. J. Soc. 592 (1988).
11. See, e.g., MARK BALDASSARE, TROUBLE IN PARADISE: THE SUBURBAN TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICA (1986); CONSTANCE PERIN, EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE: SOCIAL ORDER AND

LAND USE IN AMERICA (1977); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and

Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 405-07 (1977).
12. Gillette, supra note 1, at 979.
13. Id. at 986.
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leged interests: "parents

. .

.the elderly.

. .

the poor."' 14 If parents, the

elderly, and the poor can be "privileged," then it is hard to imagine who
will be "latent," or why domination by these "privileged" groups would
be inconsistent with the preferences of local majorities.
Moreover, Gillette's two test cases-the impact fee decisions and the
non-delegation doctrine case-both appear to concern local political decisions that reflect the preferences of local majorities. Impact fees, like
growth controls and exclusionary zoning, are often a product of majority
rule and not minority manipulation. When they adopt impact fees, communities are seeking to restrain growth or to shift the costs of growth to
developers and to non-residents. Impact fees protect the local tax base
by requiring developers to install new infrastructure or to contribute to
the local fisc. By making new homes slightly more expensive, impact fees
tend to assure that future residents will be more affluent than they might
otherwise have been, which also contributes to the fiscal and economic
well-being of the locality from the perspective of current residents. This
may be unfair and it will sometimes be exclusionary, but it is surely a
result of the active political support of a current local majority, not ma5
nipulation by a local special interest.'
The non-delegation cases are less clear-cut, but nothing in Gillette's
story suggests that these are instances of intramural one-sided lobbying.
Rather, it would seem that when a local government enters into a longterm contract with other localities or with an out-of-state public authority in order to assure its residents a future supply of electricity, it is attempting to act in behalf of the public interest of the community as a
whole. The local government's action may be improvident, may fail to
take into account the risk a "take or pay" obligation poses for a community, and may be the result of the limited administrative capacity of a
small municipality to calculate the risks of the obligation it has assumed.
But a local government's error in seeking to advance the local public
interest is not the same thing as special interest manipulation.
To be sure, not all local governments are small, and not all municipal actions reflect majority support. The local political processes in New
14. Id. at 982.
15. Gillette suggests that the use of Dillon's Rule in impact fee cases fits within his theory
because impact fee cases involve an "intramural" conflict between present and potential future residents. I suggest that impact fee cases are a lot closer to growth controls and exclusionary zoning,
with the relevant conflicts those between residents and outsiders, and between communities seeking
to limit growth and other communities in the surrounding region. Judicial scrutiny of impact fees
through the lens of externalities and spillovers would be more likely to focus the courts on the real
problems posed by such fees than would Gillette's approach of directing the courts to a close examination of the quality of the "intramural" deliberative process that precedes the adoption of a fee
requirement.
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York, Chicago and other big cities are notorious for special interest manipulation. In the big cities, local residents are ripe for exploitation by
rent-seeking "privileged" groups. But the big cities are the exception
that proves the rule. As Robert Dahl once put it, "[t]o regard the government of New York as a local government is to make nonsense of the
term." 16 With their large and demographically diverse populations; their
mix of residential, industrial and commercial land uses; and their enormous local public sectors and social service budgets, the big cities are
politically, economically, and socially far from the local government
norm found in the suburbs. Indeed, if Gillette's picture of local governments as prone to special interest manipulation fits the big cities, then the
characteristics that distinguish the big cities from other local governments suggest that Gillette's theory would fit the states and the federal
government far better.
Of course, to say that on many important local issues the local political process is likely to reflect majoritarian political sentiment, and not
minority manipulation, does not necessarily refute Gillette's assertion
that local governments are vulnerable to special interest capture. Gillette
could still be right if special interest abuse were defined to include decisions that are the preferences of the local majority. In other words, if
decisions that enjoy the true and active support of a current local majority may be seen as a form of rent-seeking at odds with the public interest,
then majority domination of local politics would be no protection against
special interest control and no guarantee of public-interest-oriented decision making. Indeed, given the likelihood of majority rule in many
smaller localities, local governments would in fact be particularly vulnerable to the dangers of majority-rule-as-special-interest-manipulation.
Gillette may be right in some objective, Olympian sense. Majorities
can be mistaken, majorities can be short-sighted, and majorities can be
selfish. Majority actions may be inconsistent with the best interests-the
public interest-of the community. But if majority rule, in the sense of
local decisions that reflect the true and active support of current majorities, does not define the local public interest, then what does? How are we
to know the local public interest apart from the interest of local majorities-and apart from our own personal biases with respect to the "right"
outcomes of particular local issues? Gillette never tells us how to tell
whether a measure enjoying local majority support defines the local public interest or is, instead, the product of the majority-as-special-interest.
16. Robert A. Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 953, 968
(1967).
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A theory predicated on the protection of the local public interest
through the restriction of local special interests must have a standard for
distinguishing the public interest from the special interests. One metric
would be whether a measure reflects the preferences of the majority of
the polity; but as local government actions are far more likely to reflect
majority preferences than state or national actions, local government is a
particularly unlikely candidate for the public-interest-promoting and special-interest-controlling features that Gillette finds in Dillon's Rule. If
majority preference is not the standard for determining the local public
interest, what is? Gillette cannot justify Dillon's Rule as a doctrine for
vindicating the local public interest without a theory of what the local
public interest is apart from the preferences of local majorities. And his
article presents no such theory.
Moreover, once the small size, relatively homogeneous preferences
and populations, and residential orientations of most local governments
are factored into the account of local politics, then Gillette's Rule begins
to look suspiciously like the old Dillon's Rule-the nineteenth century
doctrine for limiting local power and constraining local majoritiesrather than Gillette's majority-protecting, minority-constraining Rule.
As I have suggested, in many local governments the targets of Dillon's
Rule interventions will be measures adopted with majority support,
whether those majorities are deemed special interests or the public interest. It becomes difficult to accept Gillette's assertion that these politically empowered local majorities would treat Dillon's Rule as desirable
and would consent to the close judicial scrutiny and haphazard judicial
invalidation of local measures built into Dillon's Rule. Despite his commitment to local government in principle, Gillette's modern public
choice account of Dillon's Rule, by subjecting decisions enjoying local
majority support to intrusive judicial review, is in the end as antithetical
to local autonomy as the traditional justification of Dillon's Rule in terms
of the hierarchical inferiority of local governments.
II.

INNOVATION AND OPPRESSION

Gillette's second principal argument is that, assuming one finds that
local governments are particularly susceptible to special interest manipulation, Dillon's Rule is the doctrine which will remedy the problem. This
entails the further arguments that Dillon's Rule is well-designed to catch
these abuses, and that the benefits of a Dillon's Rule used for these purposes outweigh the costs.
Is Dillon's Rule well-designed to "identify those discrete sets of
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cases in which such [one-sided] lobbying [is] likely to occur"? 17 Gillette
sees a connection between one-sided lobbying and innovative local ordinances. Dillon's Rule, he notes, will most often be invoked in cases of
"municipal entrance into a novel activity, not expressly within the realm
of activities considered by the legislature."' 8 Innovation, thus, is a prerequisite for a Dillon's Rule claim. But what does innovation have to do
with "one-sided lobbying" or with the special interest manipulation
which Gillette posits as the basis for judicial intrusion?
According to Gillette,
[t]he most likely situation in which debate will reveal one-sided lobbying arises when a locality is asked to invest in a relatively novel enterprise. At that time, interests partial to the proposal will have had an
opportunity to organize and plan a strategy. Competing interests,
however, may have had insufficient opportunities to coalesce, even if
they are otherwise able to do so. 19
Thus, Dillon's Rule, "which is directed at relatively novel local activities,
appears appropriate to curtail the most likely instances of one-sided
'20
lobbying."
Gillette's suggestion of a nexus between innovation and one-sided
lobbying is interesting, but it is also entirely unsubstantiated by any authority and appears largely intuitive. I have a counterintuition-which is
equally unsupported but no less plausible-that local debate is actually
most likely to occur with respect to innovations, experiments, and other
unprecedented municipal actions.
For many people, there is both a natural resistance to change and a
preference for stability. As the literature on referendum voting has
found, when people do not understand the meaning of a ballot proposition they usually vote "no" on the assumption that "no" means no
change, and that no change is safer than any new action. 2 1 People in
power are even more likely to be invested in the status quo. After all,
they have been successful under existing rules and arrangements; a
change, especially a change that entails new regulation or higher taxes,
may be particularly unattractive to them. Thus, innovation has to overcome considerable political inertia and the natural resistance of dominant
groups.
Given the preference for stability, I would assume-it is only a
guess, but then Gillette's argument is also only a guess-that local debate
17. Gillette, supra note 1, at 984.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 990.
20. Id.
21. Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1356-57 (1985).
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is particularly likely to occur when a new and innovative proposal is being considered. An innovation may alter the status quo, effect a redistribution of municipal resources, or create new targets for municipal
regulatory attention. The unusual format or content of a municipal innovation-the proposal for a new tax or fee, for a new regulatory restriction
on developers or homeowners or landlords, for a new agency or department to house or operate a new municipal enterprise-may trigger the
attention of local interest groups, lead to demands that the local government proceed slowly so that all parties can study the matter and assess its
implications for them, and spark opposition and protests from groups
who would be subject to new controls or requirements. An innovation
by definition is not business as usual, and it is the unusual which invites
attention and leads people to think about the implications of government
action for them.
There is, in addition, an odd tension between Gillette's justification
of Dillon's Rule and the traditional defense of local autonomy in terms of
the opportunities decentralization provides for public experimentation
and creativity. Local autonomy-home rule-provides the possibility
for "laboratories of democracy," in which important public sector ideas
will first be conceived, developed, and tested at the local level, and then,
perhaps, be emulated by other localities or adopted by higher level units
of government. This notion of the desirability of "grass roots" or "bottom up" innovation, rather than an exclusive reliance on central direction and central planning, has long accounted for part of the appeal of
local autonomy in the American political tradition.
Gillette appears to recognize the dissonance between our historic
commitment to local creativity and his suspicion of local innovation
when he states that the targeting of close judicial scrutiny on "novel"
municipal actions "is not to say that novel activities are undesirable or to
refute the laboratory model of local government. ' 22 Yet it is hard to
read his linking of novel activities to one-sided lobbying without drawing
the inference that local innovation is a symptom of a cancerous condition
on the local body politic rather than a sign of the health of the system of
local governments.
Not only does Gillette have the relationship between innovation and
the sufficiency of debate backwards, his use of Dillon's Rule to police
one-sided lobbying seems dramatically underinclusive. Many rent-seeking activities occur in areas of long-standing local competence. Interest
group conflict is endemic to such traditional municipal actions as con22. Gillette, supra note 1, at 985.
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tracts for the purchase of goods and services; the sale, lease or licensing
of municipal lands; the siting of municipal facilities, like police and fire
stations or water and sewer mains; the granting of franchises; and the
most basic decisions of who and what to tax and who to benefit by public
spending.
The pursuit of self-interest is the stuff of politics, and there would
not appear to be any necessary connection between innovation and the
ongoing private feeding at the public trough. Indeed, as I have suggested, innovative forms of regulating, taxing, or spending are likely to
set off alarm bells in local politics and lead to the kind of intramural
debate that Gillette sees as the antidote to special interest abuse.
Finally, even if Gillette were right that innovations are a particular
cause for concern, is there any evidence that state courts can do what
Gillette wants them to do-review the local political process to determine whether a novel measure was the product of one-sided lobbying or
of legislative deliberation in which all affected interests were heard?
Some evidence that courts cannot be expected to do this is that Gillette offers virtually no evidence that they have ever done it. Indeed, it is
striking that in a 61-page article that purports to justify Dillon's Rule,
Gillette presents at most one case in which a state court applied Dillon's
Rule correctly, and even in that case the court's outcome did not hinge
solely on Dillon's Rule. In his analysis of the leading Dillon's Rule case,
Early Estates,2 3 Gillette concludes the Court got the analysis wrong and
'24
intervened "in the absence of any breakdown of the political process."
In one of the impact fee cases- Guilderland25-the decision turned on
state preemption and not Dillon's Rule. In Vermont Public Service 26the decision involved the nondelegation doctrine, not Dillon's Rule.
Only in Kamhi,27 the other impact fee case, did the court's decision involve some consideration of the local legislative process that led to the
adoption of the contested fee and include a finding that the matter was
beyond the scope of local power to legislate. Even in Kamhi, the Court
was concerned not with the quality of local debate but with the town's
failure to satisfy the formal requisites for local legislative action for the
28
adoption of impact fees.
More generally, the task Gillette would impose on state courts
23. Early Estates v. Housing Bd. of Review of Providence, 174 A.2d 117 (R.I. 1961).
24. Gillette, supra note 1,at 989.
25. Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 546 N.E.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989).
26. Vermont Dep't of Pub. Serv. v. Massachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 558 A.2d 215
(Vt. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 872 (1989).
27. Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 547 N.E.2d 346 (N.Y. 1989).
28. Gillette, supra note 1,at 1002-03.
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under the rubric of Dillon's Rule is an impossible one. Gillette would
like the courts to reopen the local political process, but in the vast majority of localities there is virtually no legislative history or similar materials
that a court could turn to in order to determine the quality-the "one-"
or "two-sidedness"--of municipal debate. Courts would be virtually flying blind if the nature and extent of local legislative debate were to be the
focus of Dillon's Rule. Alternatively, if Gillette's Dillon's Rule were to
turn into a requirement that local governments generate legislative histories and act only on a written record, that would be an unprecedented
and burdensome requirement for local legislative bodies to meet. Indeed,
it would be a requirement that most state legislatures cannot satisfy.
Further, even if somehow a local legislative history could be mustered and a court could inform itself about the debate that preceded the
enactment of a challenged ordinance, just how much internal debate
would constitute adequate debate and disprove a claim of "one-sided lobbying?" Would a formal recitation of the pro's and con's for the adoption
of an ordinance suffice, or would the debate have to involve a "real"
ventilation of all the relevant issues? There are few standards for judging
the quality of a debate after the fact and based on scanty legislative
materials. There is certainly the danger, as Gillette delicately puts it,
that judges "may too readily identify their own perception of the good
with that of the public at large,"' 29 so that judicial concern with the nature of local debate may slide into judicial hostility to the terms of the
measure.
Under these circumstances, a local ordinance may fail because of
judicial opposition to its substance rather than judicial dissatisfaction
with the quality of the city council's deliberations. We would, then, have
the nineteenth century Dillon's Rule of arbitrary, outcome-oriented judicial intrusion into local autonomy, rather than the focused, public-interest-protecting, public choice analysis that Gillette envisions.
The costs of Dillon's Rule are high. The Rule permits close judicial
review and results in judicial invalidation of local measures which do not
violate constitutional limits on governments generally, which are not preempted by federal or state laws, and which do not impose external burdens on nonresidents. 30 Moreover, the Rule's lack of clarity results in
29. Id. at 998.

30. As Gillette notes, "the presence of externalities can neither explain nor justify Dillon's
Rule, because activities that generate significant spillovers do not fall within the domain covered by
the Rule in the first place." Gillette, supra note 1,at 972. In other words, Dillon's Rule applies to
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inconsistent outcomes and permits decisions based on the substantive biases of state judges rather than on an informed appraisal of the proper
scope of local power. Dillon's Rule chills local autonomy in practice, by
causing the invalidation of local measures and by inducing local residents
(and local governments) to seek state political solutions to local problems
out of a concern that a local ordinance might not withstand judicial scrutiny. And Dillon's Rule is hostile to local autonomy in theory because it
embodies a view of local governments as limited agents of the state rather
3
than plenary representatives of local people. 1
I suppose a case for Dillon's Rule can be made, but that is a case
that would be grounded in a suspicion of local autonomy even with respect to matters that are local. That is not the case Gillette has made.
Gillette seeks to ground Dillon's Rule in a commitment to local autonomy, even to show that Dillon's Rule actually facilitates local autonomy.
But although his theory is ambitious and artfully argued it fails to persuade. With or without public choice, Dillon's Rule is doctrine for judicial displacement of the decisions of local majorities with respect to local
matters. And that is the negation of local autonomy.

"activities deemed properly within the local realm under some independent metric," id., and other
legal doctrines are used to control local actions with significant external effects.
31. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990).

